Remarks by the Chinese Delegation at the First Meetingof the Subsidiary Body 2 (Prevention of nuclear war) of the Conference on Disarmament
2022-03-17 22:38

17 March

    Thank you, Mr. coordinator.

On behalf of the Chinese delegation, I congratulate you on your assumption as the Coordinator, and assure you of our active support to your work.

Prevention of nuclear war and Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament are two interrelated agenda items. These two Subsidiary Bodies may carry out their work with respective focuses while complementing each other. During the preparatory phase of the Subsidiary Bodies. China actively communicated with all parties including the Coordinators in the hope that the relevant discussions will not only draw on past experience, but also take into account the new situation and new perspectives, so that member States can examine all relevant aspects of the topics in a comprehensive, balanced objective and in-depth manner.

With regard to prevention of nuclear war, China looks forward to further discussing specific ideas with all parties on the basis of the latest developments. Some member States have raised the issue of strategic risk reduction which we believe merits further discussion. Other States have raised the question of strategic stability, which is also closely related to the agenda item 1 and work of SB 1, and deserves careful study. Some other members would like to see SB 2 dwelling on all aspects related to fissile material for nuclear weapons including an FMCT. It should be noted that the CD has been discussing FMCT and related issues for more than 20 years, but has not been able to start negotiation due to profound and complex backgrounds and reasons, which cannot be attributed simply to the working mechanism of the CD and the political will of member States. China has always held that negotiations on an FMCT should and can only be conducted at the CD in accordance with the mandate contained in CD/1299. This position has not changed. Meanwhile, it is our view that the international strategic security situation has changed significantly over the past 20 years, and the issue of FMCT has involved in new elements, new stakeholders and new controversial issues, all of which need to be explored in a more frank, and in-depth manner in the CD.

Mr. coordinator,

As far as the prevention of nuclear war is concerned, theJoint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races on January 3rd has given fresh vigor to this topic. This is the first time that the P5 leaders issued a joint statement on strategic security and stability as well as nuclear arms control and disarmament. This historic document has four highlights. First, it emphasizes that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought”. It is the first time that the P5 jointly affirmed this principle, which is conducive to improving the international security environment and maintaining global strategic stability. Second, it reaffirms that none of the nuclear weapons are targeted at each other or at any other state. It is a further confirmation and development of the de-targeting commitments by the P5 on the basis of their previous bilateral agreements. In particular, the explicit reaffirmation of not targeting nuclear weapons at any state is of vital importance for the prevention of nuclear war and strengthening of security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states.Third, the statement emphasizes the importance of preserving and complying with bilateral and multilateral arms control agreements and commitments. Fourth, the statement emphasizes avoiding military confrontation and preventing arms races.

The above mentioned Joint Statement fully demonstrates the importance of the P5 Process. During its term as the coordinator of the P5 in 2019, China successfully pushed all parties to restart this process, and subsequently many outcomes were achieved, fully reflecting the commitment of the P5 to maintaining and strengthening the international regime of nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful use of nuclear energy with the NPT as its cornerstone. China looks forward to in-depth discussions among the P5 on broader strategic stability and arms control issues on the basis of the Joint Statement with a view to further enhancing mutual trust and expanding cooperation. The P5 can also make full use of SB 2 to strengthen communication with non-nuclear weapon states on the issues related to the prevention of nuclear war.

In addition, the Working Paper on Strategic Risk Reduction, a consensus document among the P5, has been submitted to the 10th RevCon of NPT. The Paper reflects the great importance which the P5 attach to deepening dialogue and communication, enhancing strategic mutual trust, avoiding misunderstanding and miscalculation, and strengthening crisis management. It outlines the efforts of the P5 to reduce strategic risks, including but not limited to dialogues on nuclear policy and doctrine, updating and revising nuclear glossary, deepening the P5 cooperation process and establishing bilateral crisis management channels. It also reaffirms their commitment to strengthen cooperation with non-nuclear weapon states, NGOs and think tanks and to share responsibility for strategic risk reduction. Many of the elements in the document could also provide food for thought for discussions in SB 2.

Mr coordinator,

At the meeting of Subsidiary Body 1 two days ago, Ambassador Li Song of China noted that “the Cold War mentality remains the most stubborn enemy and the biggest obstacle to nuclear disarmament”. I would like to emphasize here that the Cold War mentality is also the biggest driver that elevates the risk of nuclear war. Over the past 20 years, the international community has witnessed a certain big power driven by the Cold War mentality recklessly sabotaging the strategic security and arms control treaty system, seriously impacting the international strategic security landscape, undermining strategic mutual trust and security relations among countries, strengthening the military alliance system,exacerbating regional tensions and even resulting in regional conflicts. China calls on the country concerned to abandon the Cold War mentality and a strategy of major power competition, and work with the international community to make positive contribution at the international and multilateral levels in areas such as preventing nuclear war and reducing strategic risks.

At the same time, nuclear weapon states should adopt a highly responsible attitude towards nuclear weapon related issues, reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their national security strategies, abandon the policies of nuclear deterrence based on the first use of nuclear weapons,  and conclude a multilateral treaty on mutual no-first-use of nuclear weapons without delay in accordance with the initiative put forward by China in 1990s. The countries should also take all necessary measures to avoid accidental or unauthorized launches of nuclear weapons, eliminate risk of nuclear weapons accidents, and actively promote substantive work in the CD on the issue of security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states and negotiate and conclude relevant international treaties so as to provide effective security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states in a legally binding manner.Relevant nuclear-weapon States should abandon the policy and practice of nuclear sharing and extended deterrence, and withdraw all nuclear weapons that are deployed in other countries, and refrain from including any country in their nuclear target lists. The country concerned should also abandon the development and deployment of ABM systems that undermine global regional strategic stability, stop irresponsible nuclear cooperation, abandon the creation of cliques and small circles that targets the third party or harms its interests and do more to contribute to regional peace and stability and reduce the risk of conflict.

Mr. Coordinator,

The topic prevention of nuclear war should not be confined to the nuclear sphere. With the militarization of new technologies, the impact of artificial intelligence, outer space, and cyberspace on nuclear weapon systems is increasing. SB 2 should conduct comprehensive and integrated discussions on these new factors. China looks forward to working with CD members to continue substantive discussions on all issues related to the prevention of nuclear war.

Thank you, Mr. coordinator.