(30 July 2024, Geneva)

Mr. Chair,

The Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons serves as the cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, a crucial pillar of the international security system, as well as the important international law foundation for global security governance. For more than 50 years, the Treaty has provided a solid institutional guarantee for avoiding nuclear war, preventing nuclear proliferation, and promoting nuclear energy for the benefit of mankind.

At present, the international security environment is undergoing profound and complex changes, the Cold War mentality resurges, the hegemonism runs rampant, and the great power competition and the bloc confrontation are more intense. The international arms control and non-proliferation mechanism has been seriously impacted, and the review process of the Treaty encounters serious challenges. Against such a backdrop, the international community should not regard the NPT review process as simply a procedural issue, but as a substantive issue related to the universality, authority and effectiveness of the Treaty, and carry it forward steadily on the basis of prudent consideration and full consultation. The Chinese delegation would like to share its views as follows:

Firstly, the review process of strengthening NPT should be carried forward prudently. The working group meeting of strengthening NPT review process in July last year has implemented the decisions of the 10th Review Conference and accomplished its mission. The discussion of strengthening the review process on the second session of Preparatory Committee is not the continuation of the working group last year. The chair’s recommendations about strengthening the review process during the first session of the NPT Preparatory Committee does not reflect a consensus.

Secondly, the efficiency of the NPT review mechanism should be evaluated objectively. The current review mechanism may not be perfect, but it is formed through history and has been discussed repeatedly by our predecessors, reflecting the greatest common denominator of all parties’ positions. This mechanism is generally effective. It guarantees the rights of States parties to full and equal consultation, and accommodates the legitimate  security and development concerns of all parties to the greatest extent. The fact that the past two review cycles did not yield substantive results is due to the current international security reality. It is not objective to blame it for the review mechanism.

Thirdly, the overall stability of the review mechanism should be maintained. The reason why the past two review cycles did not yield substantive results is not about the review mechanism itself, so it would be misguided to reverse the existing review mechanism. It is also unrealistic to believe that as long as the review mechanism is changed, all parties can get a consensus on formulating measures about nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We should adhere to the consensual working method. The pattern of 1 Review Conference and 3 Preparatory Committee sessions every 5 years should be maintained and the structure of 3 Main Committees and their subsidiary bodies at the Review Conference should be continued. The existing arrangements for the election of the Conference President and the Chair of Preparatory Committee, the existing framework of the outcome document should be upheld. The content of the outcome document should not be pre-determined in advance, and the practice of listing each and every party’s viewpoints will only weaken the authority of the outcome document.

Fourthly, the efficiency should be improved as appropriate. Strengthening the review process should not treat nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful use of nuclear energy differently. In particular, the relationship between nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be handled properly. It is important to ensure state parties’ rights of full participation in the review process and agenda setting, and full expression of their positions and concerns. China supports a number of pragmatic and feasible reform proposals, including properly reducing the duration of the Review Conference and the meeting of the Preparatory Committee; rationally coordinating the division between the Review Conference and the Preparatory Committee, so as to avoid the latter duplicating the work of the former; appropriately enhancing coordination between the Chairs of Preparatory Committee and the Conference President, etc.

Fifthly, issues of transparency, reporting and accountability should be approached prudently. The so-called transparency and accountability can not achieve nuclear disarmament. In the current international reality, full consideration must be given to the differences among nuclear-weapon States in terms of the size of their nuclear arsenals, nuclear policies and security environment, and the differences of priorities for nuclear transparency among countries should be accepted. It is impossible for all countries to be totally transparent. If we blindly demand the States to formulate a standard reporting template including the sensitive information like the number of nuclear weapons and means of delivery, the location of deployment, the combat readiness, as well as the command and the control, it is important to impose the nuclear transparency obligation on all nuclear-weapon States without distinction, which will strengthen the strategic superiority of some countries , and harm the security interests of other countries. China advocates that the frequency of national reports should be subject to voluntary consultation among the five nuclear-weapons States, and the P5 continue to submit their reports in accordance with the common framework reached in 2013, without a universally applicable template. If the reports of Nuclear-Weapon States are discussed, the reports of non-Nuclear-Weapon States under nuclear umbrella should also be discussed.

Mr. Chair,

China is ready to work with all State Parties to continue to explore how to strengthen the NPT review process in a serious and responsible manner, and carefully summarize the successes and failures in the implementation of the Treaty. We are committed to make efforts to encourage all parties to bridge differences and strengthen cooperation, promote the three pillars in a balanced manner, safeguard and strengthen the universality, authority and effectiveness of the Treaty, and promote the global peace, security and development.  

Thank you, Mr. Chair.