Good morning, dear colleagues!
Just now, the panelists shared their views on the threats and risks to space security mostly from a technical perspective. Their perspectives, I believe, contribute to our understanding of the current threats and risks to space security. I would like to share with you China’s view of the security situation in the outer space, from both political and technical perspectives.
To begin with, the assessment of threats and risks to space security shall be based on a holistic view of the situation and an in-depth analysis of the root cause of the problem.
At present, the security of outer space is faced with a range of threats and risks, including orbital congestion, accidental collision, space debris, and placement of weapons. These issues are different in nature, and fall into two different categories, namely, safety and security. The two categories of issues are different in terms of their levels of priority and have different solutions. Therefore, we should not simply lump them together, nor confuse their level of priority.
China believes that weaponization of the outer space and the risk of an arms race is the most fundamental threat to the security of outer space. If we fail to prohibit weaponization, to prevent an arms race, or armed conflicts in the outer space, and prevent the outer space from becoming a “war-fighting domain”, there will never be tranquility in outer space, not to mention safety, security and sustainability of outer space.
The root cause for weaponization and heightened risks in the outer space is the policies and strategies aimed at domination in the outer space, and driven by such policies and strategies, its combat-oriented plan to develop armament, build up combat systems and military alliances in the outer space, as well as inclusion of commercial space enterprises into space combat systems. Such policies and strategies aggravate the risk of weaponizing outer space and turning it into a battlefield, undermine global strategic security and stability, and mix military activities with civil space activities, thus increasing the complexity of outer space security governance. Threats of this kind may be referred to as “doctrinal threats”. They are fundamental, and merit urgent attention.
Secondly, the long-standing absence of an international legally binding instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space further exacerbates the threats to outer space security.
The existing international law system on space, including the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, either focus only on specific weapons such as nuclear ones, or prohibit hostile activities only in certain areas, such as the Moon. They do not deal with the test, placement and use of conventional weapons in the outer space, the use or threat of use of force against space objects, or the specific obligations and responsibilities associated with commercial space activities. As a result, there is an apparent gap in the current international legal system in terms of the prevention of weaponization of space, making it hard to sustain security in outer space. Filling that gap through legislation or legal interpretation should be viewed as an effective way to address the security threats.
Past experience show that voluntary measures, such as code of conduct, political commitment and transparency and confidence-building measures are inadequate to prevent an arms race in outer space. Without a full-fledged legal system, there is no effective restraint, and the cost of breaking norms is negligible. Such norms, rules and principles will become, in effect, rules of engagement, or be cast aside.
Recently, the Group of Governmental Experts on further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space adopted by consensus a report with its mandate of “to consider and make recommendations on substantial elements of an international legally binding instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, including, inter alia, on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space”. The adoption of the report shows that negotiating a LBI remains the most effective way to prevent an arms race in outer space, that national policies and strategies on outer space has an important impact on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and that focusing on “the use of force” and “weapons” remains viable ways to prevent an arms race in outer space. In this regard, the draft Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (PPWT), submitted by China and Russia to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and later updated, is the only draft treaty on the table for the negotiation of a LBI on PAROS. We look forward to the support and constructive input from all sides. We welcome the CD’s decision to establish subsidiary bodies this year, and hope for substantive progress to build upon the outcome of the GGE in relevant discussions in the coming year.
To conclude, I would like to stress that security in outer space bears on the security and development interests of all countries and the well-being of mankind. We advocate for the building of a community with a shared future for mankind in outer space, and are committed to a vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security. We need to reject the Cold War mentality and pursuit for domination, and oppose seeking security at the cost of others’ security. We support a comprehensive and balanced approach to outer space security threats with focus on PAROS and the prevention of weaponization of outer space, so as to protect the rights of all countries to peaceful uses of outer space, and safeguard common security interests in outer space.
Thank you.