Keynote Speech by H.E. Amb. LI Song at the 2021 Outer Space Security Conference
2021-09-28 23:43

(Palais Des Nations, 28 September)

Dear colleagues, ladies and gentlemen,

The SSOD-IestablishedPAROS as a common goal of the international community for space security in 1978.Over the past 40 years, the UNGA has been adopting the resolution on PAROS by overwhelming majority each and every year, requesting the CD to negotiate a legally binding instrument. However, it could not happen during the Cold Warin the context of intensecompetition in outer spacebetween the two superpowers, with programs such as “Star Wars”. After the Cold War, especially in the past 20 years, the UShas tried repeatedly to shirk its existing treaty obligations on arms control, and refused to be bound by new legal instruments in domains such as outer space.Exactly because of its national strategyof “Space Dominance”, the US rejected the CD to start treaty negotiations on PAROS.

Thanks to the rapid development of space technologies, the peaceful use and exploration of outer space havefurtherbenefited the world and greatly promoted the development of human society in the 21st century. The imperative demand for the peaceful nature and peaceful use of outer space on the one hand, and the attempt by a superpower to seek space dominance on the other, has struck such a stark contrast, posingthe biggest challenge to space tranquility and security. Preventing the weaponization of and an arms race in outer space remains the most important and urgent task and goal for space security.

Currently, we are faced with two approaches on how to effectively address challenges to space security, namely “law-based approach” and “rule-based approach”, targeting at “acts in outer space” and “behaviours in outer space” respectively. The PPWTsubmitted by Russia and China to the CD sticks to the long-term goals of PAROS, representing the law-based approach. By prohibiting the placement of weapons in outer space as well as the use or threat of use of force against outer space objects, the PPWT could serve as an effective instrument to address the core issues in outer space security. Based on careful consideration of the dual-use nature of space technology and the complexity of possible space weapons, the key obligations in the PPWT focus on the two most threatening actsagainst the peaceful use of outer space, rather than singling out any specific weapon system.It is a result-oriented approach, focusing on acts, and providing an effective and feasible law-based solution for space security. China is committed to promoting the PPWT negotiation. Once it is concluded, we will call upon all the space powers to set good examples in upholding and implementing such a treaty together with China.

The UN GGE established in 2017 conducted a comprehensive and in-depth study on elements of an international legally-binding instrument on PAROS, including those elements in the PPWT. The GGE almost adopted an objective and balanced report, only to be blocked by the US at the last minute. Such an important and recent efforthas further demonstrated that the negotiation of a legal instrument on PAROS not only enjoys broad political support and solid technical foundations, but also is increasingly necessary and urgent.

The argument used by the US to boycott the PPWT is about verification. It claimed that the lack of verification measureswas a "fundamental flaw" in the draft.Here, we witnessed yet again the practice of double standard. The BWC has been in force for more than four decades, without verification. It isone of the most important multilateral treatieson WMD. The US has unilaterally blocked the negotiations on a BWC verification protocol for 20 years. There is no sign on it’s part to change its mind.Such kind of double standard is by itself "fundamental flaw", blocking the international efforts on PAROS. The PPWT by no means excludes verification.In view of the complexity of outer space verification, we can conclude a legally binding treaty shutting the door for weaponization and arms race in outer spacefrom both legal and political perspectives in the first place. When technical conditions are ripe, we could then negotiate and conclude an additional protocol on verification. With further development of space technology, verification would not bea permanently pending issue for PAROS. Therefore, verification is neither an obstacle to PPWT, nor a valid excuse to block the negotiations. We urge the US not to stand in the way of the PPWT negotiation in the CD.

Dear Colleagues,

Discussion on “responsible behaviors in outer space” is an example of rule-based approach. Two years ago, when Amb. Aidan Liddle of the UK first elaborated this idea to me, I told him that a UNGA resolution as such should be discussed atthe joint session of the 1stand 4th Committee. The UK initiative intertwines the two dimensions of space security and the peaceful use of outer space. It blurs the lines between security risks caused by an arms race in outer space and the safety risks arising from its peaceful use.It is trying to regulate space behaviors in a loose, vague and highly subjective manner.If outer space cannot be preserved from becoming a battlefield, the “rules on traffic” in space would have no difference from “rules of engagement”in the space domain. If space security falls into a paradigm that the superpower “dominates” as a result of its strategy of “Space Dominance” in essence, and other countries “behave” as a result of “responsible behaviors”, it will inevitably undermine the legitimate security interests of most countries, and go against the common goal of the international community to safeguard space security. "Codes of conduct", as transparency and confidence-building measures, can serve as a supplementary component of a treaty on PAROS. It should not deviate the multilateral disarmament efforts from its long-standing focus, or even hijack the efforts of the "law-based" approach on PAROS.

Space war, like nuclear war, can not be won and must never be fought. Safeguarding outer space security is the shared responsibility for all countries, especially those space powers. Negotiating a legally binding instrument for PAROS is long overdue in multilateral arms control. It cannot be delayed any longer. The CD has shouldered this responsibility for 40 years. Relevant substantive works should be started sooner rather than later. The PPWT is an open and inclusive text.Further discussions and improvements by all the CD members are welcome. Even if it is still difficult to formally initiate negotiations on PPWT, the CD should start its substantive work in this regard through subsidiary bodies, technical expert groups, etc., and conduct technical discussions on broad issues such as the scope, obligations, definitions, verification, and transparency measures of the treaty, so as to lay an even more solid ground for treaty negotiations.

Meanwhile, efforts can also be made to strengthen the interactions and coordination between the CD and the UN GGE, the Open-Ended Working Group, the UNDC, the COPUOS, as well as the 1st and 4thCommittees of the UNGA. It is also necessary and important to communicate with space industries and academic institutions to mobilize efforts from all international sectors to give impetus to the process of PAROS in the new era.

Some countries are pushing for the establishment of an Open-Ended Working Group on “responsible behaviors in outer space” by the UNGA this year. Since the relevant draft resolution is listed under the item "Prevention of An Arms Race in Outer Space" in UNGA agenda, it is totally logical that this OEWG should include PAROS as one of its outstanding topics and conduct itswork in an open, inclusive, objective and balanced manner. Therefore we can make serious and responsible efforts in effectively safeguarding space security.

Thank you for your attention. I am looking forward to the Q&A.