Mr. President,

Agenda item 3 “Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS)” is among the core items of the Conference on Disarmament, and is one of China’s top priorities in disarmament and arms control. China is committed to advance substantive work at the CD on this agenda item at an early date.

Mr. President,

PAROS is a task of highest priority and urgency in safeguarding security in outer space. In 1958, the UN General Assembly adopted the resolution“Question of the Peaceful Use of Outer Space”, which explicitly stated the wish to avoid extending national rivalries into outer space. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty further established several basic principles, such as peaceful exploration and use of the outer space. The 1978 First Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament (SSOD-I) stated that “in order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held.” Since 1981, the UN General Assembly adopts resolutions on a yearly basis with the support of overwhelming majority, mandating the CD to negotiate a legally binding instrument on PAROS.

In recent years, a certain country, clinging to its Cold War mentality, pursues a strategy of dominance in space, seeks a unilateral strategic advantage in outer space and defines the outer space as a war-fighting domain. It established Space Force and Space Command, merged commercial space enterprises into their space combat system, conducted frequent space weapon tests and military exercises, built military alliances, and enhanced combat readiness in space in an all-round manner. Some other space-faring states established dedicated space military bodies to increase their capacity of space forces. Certain military-political bloc even defined outer space as an operational domain where collective defense provisions are applicable. Such moves heightened risks of the weaponization and arms race in space, and poses a fundamental threat to security in the outer space. To shy away from this fundamental threat and exaggerate the threat of space debris and orbit collision is a misplacement of priority. Realistically speaking, the first order of business of PAROS is to prevent the weaponization of and an arms race in space.

Mr. President,

Negotiating a legally binding instrument on outer space arms control, and thus addressing the absence of prevention of outer space weaponization in international space law, is a most fundamental and effective way to address security issue in outer space.

Although Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty prohibits the placement in orbit around the earth of any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, relevant international space law does not prohibit the placement of other weapons. To fill this legal blank space, China and Russia co-submitted to the CD the draft treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects  (PPWT), and updated it in 2014, which is contained in CD/1985.

The draft PPWT contains two core obligations, i.e., prohibition of placement of weapons in outer space, and prohibition of the use or threat of use of force against outer space objects. Both obligations serve to decrease and eliminate States’ need and willingness to conduct activities such as research, production and use of weapons in outer space, prevent placement of weapons in outer space and use of force against outer space objects, and prevent the outer space from becoming a battlefield.

The draft PPWT also provides specification in terms of definition, transparency and confidence building measures. For example, the term “weapon in outer space” is defined as any outer space object or its component produced or converted to eliminate, damage or disrupt normal functioning of objects in outer space, on the Earth’s surface or in the air, as well as to eliminate population, components of biosphere important to human existence, or to inflict damage to them by using any principles of physics. The draft Treaty also states that “in order to enhance confidence in compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, States Parties can implement on a voluntary basis, unless agreed otherwise, agreed transparency and confidence-building measures”. To reach agreement on prevention of an arms race in outer space in the form of a legally binding instrument at an early date, and taking into consideration the complexities of verification, it is our proposal to emulate the approach of the Biological Weapons Convention(BWC) negotiations, which prioritizes the negotiation of the Treaty itself, and temporarily shelves controversial issues, such as a legally-binding verification mechanism. As stated in the Comments submitted by China and Russia to the CD in 2015 (CD/2042), Article V of the updated draft provides for an opportunity to elaborate an appropriate additional protocol. It needs to be pointed out that an instrument’s legal efficacy is not premised on a verification mechanism. International instruments such as the Outer Space Treaty and the BWC do not have compliance verification mechanisms, but this does not diminish their efficacy.

I would like to reaffirm that the draft PPWT is an open text. Its purpose is to provide an essential foundation for negotiating a legally-binding instrument on outer space arms control. Constructive inputs from all sides are welcomed. This is conducive to substantial preparation at the CD for a new international legally-binding instrument on outer space.

A certain country, out of the unwillingness to substantively constrain its space force building-up, has long resisted the negotiation for an international instrument on outer space arms control. This caused relevant process to stagnate, and resulted in some countries’ effort to shift the focus, for example, to norms, rules and principles on responsible behaviors to reduce space threats. It must be noted that discussing and formulating “soft laws” such as the said norms, rules and principles on responsible behaviors should be neither substitution nor pre-requisite negotiation of an international legally binding instrument on PAROS.

Mr. President,

Prevention of an arms race in outer space calls for synergy among different processes of outer space security governance. For quite some time, the CD and the Disarmament Commission have had in-depth discussions on PAROS. In 2022, the Subsidiary Body of the CD adopted a report on PAROS;last year, the UNDC reached a consensus recommendations or transparency and confidence-building measures on outer space activities. At the same time, the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) and Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) under the General Assembly have done their work. The latest session of the GGE on PAROS is still deliberating substantive elements for a legally-binding instrument. In 2025, the processes of the OEWGs on PAROS and responsible behaviors may proceed in parallel.

China supports this year’s GGE in reaching a substantive outcome on the substantive elements of a legally binding instrument on PAROS and related practical measures on the basis of its previous work, so as to provide a good basis for the commencement of the work of the OEWGs next year. It should be emphasized that China hopes that the relevant efforts within the framework of the UN General Assembly will focus on the fundamental path of a legally binding instrument, taking into account various initiatives and proposals in an integrated manner, so as to form effective synergies and make solid preparations for the early commencement of substantive work in the CD on the negotiation of a legally binding instrument on PAROS.

Some country argues that we must let the OEWG and the GGE complete their work and defer any negotiations in this body until there is greater consensus around the aims of any such negotiation. This argument remains to be further examined. According to the mandate of relevant groups, if the CD agrees upon a comprehensive and balanced programme of work that includes the negotiation of an international legally binding instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, the GGE and OEWG will conclude their work and submit the results thereof to the Secretary-General for onward transmission to the CD.

China is of the opinion that before the negotiation of an international legally-binding instrument starts, subsidiary bodies may continue to be established under the CD, and member states may continue broad-based, technical discussions, building on past contributions, on issues including the scope, obligation, verification, definition and transparency measures such as elements for norms of responsible behaviors, and make good preparation for future negotiations for a legally binding instrument.

Thank you, Mr. President.