(17 March 2026, Geneva)
Mr. President,
At the outset, I would like to congratulate you on assuming the rotating Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament, and thank you for outlining your priorities during your presidency. The Chinese delegation will fully support your work, and look forward to positive progress in the work of the Conference this year under your leadership with your rich experience.
We would like also to thank Ambassador Julien Thoni for briefing on the discussions of Subsidiary Body 2 of the CD last year. As Coordinator, Ambassador Thoni led member states in in-depth discussions on the international strategic security environment, practical measures and political measures to prevent nuclear war, and relevant possible legally-binding instruments. Although member states didn’t reach consensus on the final report of the Subsidiary Body, the discussions were of great significance in enhancing mutual understanding and building consensus in the future. Judging from the discussions, member states have put forward many practical suggestions on issues such as reducing risks of use or accidental use of nuclear weapons, prevention of upgrading and expansion of nuclear security alliances, and reducing the role of nuclear weapons. These can serve as a useful foundation for the future work.
Mr. President,
Nuclear weapons are the "Sword of Damocles" hanging over humanity. Under the current circumstances, marked by turbulence and transformation, geopolitical conflicts are frequently emerging, and uncertainties are increasing. Concerns in the international community about the risk of nuclear weapon use, or even the outbreak of nuclear war, are on the rise. On the one hand, intensified confrontation among major powers and geopolitical tensions are heightening the risks of nuclear arms races and nuclear conflict. On the other hand, some security alliances continue to strengthen "nuclear sharing" and "extended deterrence" arrangements, and increasing the role of nuclear weapons in national and collective security policies. If nuclear-weapon States or blocs involving nuclear-weapon States fall into confrontation or even military conflict, the risk of escalation would pose even more severe challenges to regional and global peace.
Mr. President,
In the face of a complex and grave international security situation, Chinese leaders have repeatedly reaffirmed that nuclear weapons must not be used and nuclear wars must never be fought. Avoiding war among nuclear-weapon States and reducing strategic risks are the foremost responsibilities of nuclear-weapon States. In January 2022, the leaders of the five nuclear-weapon States issued the Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races, reaffirming that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought," and emphasizing that the nature of nuclear weapons is to serve defensive purposes, deter aggression, and prevent war. Under the current circumstances, it is of great practical significance for nuclear-weapon States to reaffirm these commitments and advance the implementation of the Joint Statement.
Mr. President,
The adoption by nuclear-weapon States of a no-first-use policy, or a mutual no-first-use commitment, is a practical measure to implement Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), reduce the role of nuclear weapons in national security policies, and achieve the goal of nuclear disarmament. Under the current international strategic security environment, such policy and actions would promote adjustments by nuclear-weapon States in their nuclear posture, nuclear arsenal planning, and the composition and deployment of strategic forces, enhance their willingness to reduce nuclear arsenals, and gradually build consensus on the prohibition of nuclear weapon use. At the same time, these measures would improve the safety and controllability of nuclear command and control systems, reduce the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons, and effectively manage the risk of escalation of regional conventional conflicts.
China once again calls on nuclear-weapon States to conclude a treaty on mutual no-first-use of nuclear weapons, or to issue a political statement in this regard, and advocates that nuclear-weapon States make a clear commitment never to be the first to use nuclear weapons against other parties under any circumstances. China stands ready to conduct in-depth discussions within the P5 framework on elements of such a treaty or statement, including possible definitions and verification measures. We also call on non-nuclear-weapon States to actively respond to and support this initiative.
Mr. President,
It is both a natural requirement for nuclear-weapon States to fulfill their obligations and commitments, and a key measure to effectively address the legitimate security concerns of non-nuclear-weapon States, for nuclear-weapon States to commit, in a universal, non-discriminatory, and legally-binding manner, not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones. This is significant for ensuring that nuclear weapons are never used.
Negotiating and concluding an international legally-binding instrument providing unconditional negative security assurance to non-nuclear-weapon States has long been the aspiration of such states, and the CD has a solid foundation of work in this regard. China looks forward to the early establishment of an ad hoc committee to commence such negotiation. Issues concerning non-parties to the NPT and NATO nuclear alliance can be addressed through negotiations and should not be used as pretexts to delay the commencement of negotiations.
China's position on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) has been consistent. The CD is the only appropriate forum for negotiating such a treaty. China supports to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral, and effectively verifiable FMCT in accordance with the mandate contained in the Shannon Report, on the basis of a comprehensive and balanced Program of Work of the CD and broad participation of all major stakeholders. Some countries have referred to the moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. China's position is clear: such moratorium lacks a clear definition and scope and is not verifiable. It has little practical significance and may instead weaken the political momentum for negotiating an FMCT. We urge those countries to carefully reflect: when some nuclear-weapon States committed to moratorium can transfer fissile materials for nuclear weapons without restriction, increase their nuclear arsenals under the pretext of external threats, or engage in nuclear submarine cooperation involving tons of weapons-grade fissile materials with non-nuclear-weapon States, what is the real purpose of such a moratorium? Does it promote nuclear disarmament, or seek their own strategic advantage? Does it help prevent nuclear war, or fuel arms races?
Mr. President,
The SSOD-1 Final Document clearly states that "the most effective guarantee against the danger of nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons."
Before the complete prohibition and thorough elimination of nuclear weapons, mutual no-first-use commitments among nuclear-weapon States, along with unconditional assurances not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones, would minimize and even eliminate the risk of nuclear war to the greatest extent and constitute practical measures to advance nuclear disarmament. We call on the CD to begin substantive work on these issues as soon as possible and promote negotiations on relevant legal instruments.
Thank you, Mr. President.