Mr. President,

Thank you for convening this meeting. Thank Mr. Mohamed ELGHITANY for his presentation and for his work as the coordinator of the SB4 of the Conference on Disarmament(CD) last year. The draft report of the SB4 has reached broad consensus among member states and laid a good foundation for the future work.

Mr. President, 

Pending the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, it is the legitimate and lawful rights of non-nuclear-weapon States to obtain legally binding security assurances from nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances.

During the 11th Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons(NPT), the non-nuclear-weapon States including Non-Allianed Movement(NAM) countries once again called for the early commencement of negotiations on effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory, irrevocable and legally binding negative security assurances by nuclear-weapon States to all non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances. Just now, the representative of the Group of 21 once again reaffirmed the relevant propositions.

Although the review conference ultimately failed to achieve substantive outcomes, judging from the discussions, the overwhelming majority of states parties called for early formulation of recommendations on all aspects of the issue of negative security assurance, including the possibility of an international legally binding agreement.

China believes that providing legally binding security assurances by nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear-weapon States would help maintain global strategic stability, reduce strategic risks, strengthen the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, advance nuclear disarmament and ultimately promote the achievement of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.

As the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, the CD should regard the negotiation of an international legally binding instrument on negative security assurances as one of its highest priorities and advance this process accordingly. Building on its previous work, the Conference should seize the opportunity to harvest this “lowest-hanging fruit” at an early date. To this end, China proposes that:

First, the CD should establish an ad hoc committee as soon as possible to commence negotiations on the relevant international legal instrument. In previous discussions, some Member States raised a number of specific questions regarding issues such as scope of participation, rights and obligations, and verification requirements, including who should provide such assurances, to whom they should be provided, and whether verification provisions should be included. All these issues can be fully discussed during the negotiations with a view to identifying appropriate solutions. 

Second, pending the conclusion of negotiations on such an international legal instrument, all nuclear-weapon States should take measures to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in national and collective security policies. Nuclear-weapon States should abandon nuclear deterrence policies based on the first use of nuclear weapons, refrain from designating any State as a target of nuclear strikes, lower the operational readiness of their nuclear forces, cease targeting any country with nuclear weapons under their control, and publicly declare their unconditional commitment not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones.

Third, efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones should be supported. Nuclear-weapon States should respect the legal status of nuclear-weapon-free zones, sign and ratify all protocols to nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties that are open for signature, and take concrete measures to implement the relevant security assurances. The relevant nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States should refrain from actions that would undermine or impair the status of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

Fourth, the issue of the rights and obligations of non-nuclear-weapon States benefiting from “nuclear umbrella” arrangements should be properly addressed. During the 11th Review Conference of the NPT, many States Parties expressed strong concerns regarding arrangements such as “nuclear sharing” and “extended deterrence”. Judging from the evolution of the nuclear policies of nuclear-weapon States, nuclear alliances are closely linked to the issue of negative security assurances. It is therefore necessary for the CD to conduct in-depth discussions on the rights and obligations of non-nuclear-weapon States participating in “nuclear sharing” and “extended deterrence” arrangements.

We look forward to the CD commencing substantive work on negative security assurances at an early date.

Thank you, Mr. President.